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ABSTRACT 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a communist country dominated 
by one political party that controls the economy and all functions in the state. As a result 
of the dysfunctional elements of the socialist economic model, and amid the loss of a 
major benefactor in the USSR and the untimely occurrence of natural disasters, the 
incredibly severe famine that occurred in the mid-1990s served to disrupt many of the 
institutions vital to North Korea’s Stalinist state structure and command economy. Today, 
the effects of this breakdown are evident in the development and maintenance of two 
additional economies within North Korea, in addition to the official communist 
command economy. First, is the jangmadang (market ground) economy, where every 
day North Korean citizens buy and sell commodities in the many markets scattered 
across the country, which has produced a generation that has grown more capitalist 
in nature and less dependent and in awe of the state. The second is an elite economy, in 
which North Korean political and military elites compete for access to state resources in 
order to run quasi-private enterprises in pursuit of hard currency. The elites’ antagonistic 
relationship among themselves is complicated by a symbiotic relationship with the state, 
because each side needs the other for opportunities for revenue accumulation. In 
summary, North Korea is much less communist than the regime would like to admit. 
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The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) was established 
following the division of the Korean peninsula between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the wake of World War II (WWII) .1 Kim Il Sung was installed by the USSR to 
be, simultaneously, the leader of the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) and the leader of the 
state (Figure 1). Naturally, the DPRK’s political economy came to resemble that of the 
Soviet Union, a communist country dominated by one political party that controlled the 
economy and all functions in the state. The Soviet Union would collapse in 1991, but the 
Kim family and the KWP would continue their domination over the North Korean state 
and attempt to hold on to its socialist roots. However, as a result of the dysfunctional 
elements of the socialist economic model, and amid the loss of a major benefactor in the 
USSR and the untimely occurrence of natural disasters (whose effects were compounded 
by poor governance and poor economic and agricultural management), the severe famine 
that occurred in the mid-1990s served to disrupt many of the institutions vital to North 
Korea’s Stalinist state structure and command economy.2  
 
1 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. 1st ed. (New York: Ecco, 2012), 
69. 
2 Stephan Haggard , and Marcus Noland. “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of 
Denuclearization and Proliferation,” Asian Survey 50, no. 3 (May 2010): 543. https://doi.org/10.1525/
as.2010.50.3.539.  
2 
Figure 1. The birth of the Regime3 
Today, the effects of this breakdown are evident in the development and 
maintenance of two additional economies within North Korea, in addition to the official 
communist command economy. The first is the jangmadang (market ground) economy, 
where every day North Korean citizens buy and sell commodities of both necessity and 
comfort in the many markets which now can be found scattered nearly everywhere across 
the country. The second is an elite economy, in which North Korean political and military 
elites compete for access to state resources in order to run quasi-private enterprises of 
varying sizes in pursuit of hard currency. Significantly, both of these parallel economies 
are distinctly capitalist in nature, undermining not only the regime’s official fiction that it 
continues to run an orthodox communist economy, but also the ability of the command 
economy that does still remain to recover from the effects of the famine.  
The breakdown of state institutions which were the backbone of the command 
economy, combined with the growth of capitalist-like parallel economies, has changed the 
dynamics of domestic relationships within the DPRK. The parallel capitalist economies 
3 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 341. 
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within the state have affected relationships between the state and three social groups: 
average citizens, political elites, and military elites. Furthermore, a capitalist mindset has 
changed dynamics internal to these social groups to include intra-family relationships 
amongst citizens and the competition between military and political elites for state 
resources. This thesis investigates how the North Korean economy has changed in the post 
famine era and how this transformation has affected core social and political relationships 
in the country.  
This thesis proceeds as follows. First, a brief literature review discusses the 
scholarship concerning both private market activity in communist states and the intricacies 
of North Korean private market activity in particular. Chapter two provides a short 
overview of the pre-famine command economy, including its social structure. This section 
also discusses the various factors that led to the famine of the mid-1990s, the devastation 
caused by the famine itself, and how this experience crippled state institutions. Chapter 
three discusses the post-famine parallel economy, known as the jangmadang economy, that 
developed from roughly 2000 to the present day as a result of ordinary citizens response to 
the famine. Chapter four covers the same time period, examining the elite economy, with 
section A and B covering political and military elites, respectively. Finally, Chapter five 
explores how the development of these economies shaped domestic relationships. Section 
A examines how the  jangmadang economy has produced the jangmadang generation, how 
this group views the state, and how intra-family relationships are changing as a result of 
market activity. Section B examines the triangular relationship between military elites, 
political elites, and the regime.  
Literature Review 
North Korea is not unlike many other communist countries, in that it can be 
comparatively difficult for analysts to decipher how the state and economy actually 
function and how this might differ from the official face of the state and economy presented 
to the rest of the world. At the same time, many lessons can be learned from other formerly 
traditional-communist countries and economies that have dissolved or transitioned into 
capitalist systems. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, a great deal of information has become 
4 
available about these states. The literature review that follows here first discusses the 
private economies that function inside nominal command economies, with a focus on the 
communist states of Eastern Europe, which saw black market or private economies develop 
as a means (whether planned, tacitly accepted, or amid active state disapproval) to prop up 
countries’ official command economies. Next, the literature review discusses debate over 
how the North Korean private economy works and is structured. Like many other aspects 
of the DPRK domestic arena, its private economy (or, better said, economies), represent a 
variation on what was seen to emerge in other communist states. Additionally, because of 
the difficulty of acquiring reliable information on the inner workings of the state in North 
Korea, a debate exists about just how many parallel economies operate outside of the 
official command economy in the first place.  
Contrary to common belief, private economies, sometimes referred to shadow 
economies, are commonplace in communist regimes. Since these informal economies are 
important for providing stability within communist states, it is important to try and 
understand how they work and how they intertwine with their formal counterparts. To that 
end, there exist many studies of how these relationships work in former communist states.  
Many of the former communist states of the eastern bloc of Europe “depended on 
‘second economies,’ the black and gray markets that served as the safety valves for the 
rank inefficiencies and hypocrisies of the formal state economy.”4  Hungary had a very 
strong private economy that created a complex system of legal and illegal interaction 
between the country’s formal and informal economies.5 Even the Soviet Union, arguably 
the country whose name is most synonymous with communism, had  its own share of 
private market activity. Grossman, in his study of the USSR underground economy, notes 
that private market activity flourished in the communist giant even as soon as just after the 
end of WWII.6  He argues that the underground economy became important because “it 
 
4 Justin V. Hastings, A Most Enterprising Country: North Korea in the Global Economy, Ithaca ; 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2016.) 15.  
5  Hastings, 16.  
6 Gregory Grossman, “Sub-Rosa Privatization and Marketization in the USSR,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 507, no. 1 (January 1990): 46. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0002716290507001005. 
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supplies goods and services of great variety and often relatively superior quality, which the 
official sector cannot provide properly, if it provides them at all, or cannot provide as 
cheaply.”7For decades, these capitalist markets helped to make up for many of the 
deficiencies of socialist economic structures.  
In his study on private economies as a destabilizing force for communist regimes 
(and as background for discussion on North Korea’s version in particular), Dukalskis 
identifies four main ways in which  these markets can help strengthen a nominally 
communist economic regime:  
The shadow economy can be stabilising for both the official economy and 
the political system in four distinct ways. First, the vague permissibility of 
market activities is beneficial to the regime insofar as it allows the flexible 
enforcement of the law…. Second, the shadow market can alleviate 
inefficiencies and supplement the poor performance of the official 
economy…. Third, the hidden economy can act as a social pacifier in 
contexts featuring a scarcity of goods and services promised by the state…. 
Fourth, the hidden economy can entrench economic and political inertia by 
creating vested interests in the status quo.8 
These advantages have led some communist states—including North Korea—to endorse 
and even encourage the development of such private economic activity, in many forms. 
Dukalskis continues to elaborate, though, upon several reasons why these economies can 
prove not only helpfully supplemental, but also disruptive when intertwined with otherwise 
socialist economies:  
However, there are at least three other ways in which the parallel market 
contributes to corrode the power of a socialist regime. First, the existence 
of a pervasive second economy demonstrates that the regime’s ability to 
enforce its will is limited…Second, the shadow economy can act as a social 
and material foundation for opposition to the regime…Third, the parallel 
market can facilitate cynicism from collectivist ideologies and activities 
sponsored by the regime.9 
 
7 Grossman, 47. 
8 Alexander Dukalskis, “North Korea’s Shadow Economy: A Force for Authoritarian Resilience or 
Corrosion?” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 3 (March 15, 2016): 490. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09668136.2016.1154137 
9 Alexander Dukalskis, “North Korea’s Shadow Economy,” 491.  
6 
Therefore, private economic activity presents a double-edged sword for communist 
states:  these shadow economies can be both advantageous and disruptive to communist 
regimes. Understanding the complex relationships which develop from these interactions 
can be crucial to understanding the regime as a whole.  
Amongst the scholars who have examined the coexistence of an official command 
economy and private market economies in North Korea in particular, while there is a 
general consensus that parallel economies do exist next to the official command economy 
and serve an increasingly important role, there is a disagreement about how many parallel 
economies exist, and how to determine which ones are important enough to count as such. 
Greitens, for example, proposes that two parallel economic tracks were born: one created 
by elites on the basis of their access to state assets, and the other created by common 
citizens given their need for basic necessities.10  Greitens summarizes, “North Korean 
elites pioneered one set of transnational links to the outside world to further both their 
physical and political survival, while ordinary people adopted and created another set of 
illicit trans-border connections to survive.”11  She further argues that as these two parallel 
economies have continued to interact with the state and each other, internal relationships 
within North Korea have begun be restructured as well.  
Conversely, Habib separates North Korea’s private sector into even more parallel 
economies than Greitens does. Habib argues that as a result of the famine of the mid 1990s, 
the North Korean economy is now split into five separate economies. The first is the 
official, or command, economy, which consists of a planned economy with all financial 
institutions owned and operated by the state.12   The second is the “illicit economy,” which 
revolves around illegal activities on the part of the state, which deals in the exportation of 
 
10 Sheena Greitens, “Explaining Economic Order in North Korea” In Korea and the 
World: New Frontiers in Korean Studies, edited by Gregg Brazinsky, 129–30.( New York. Lexington 
Books. 2019).  
11 Greitens, 129–130. 
12 Benjamin Habib, “North Korea’s Parallel Economies: Systemic Disaggregation Following the 
Soviet Collapse,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 152. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.04.004. 
7 
narcotics, counterfeit currencies, smuggling, and money laundering.13 The third economy 
he describes is the “court economy,” in which the Kim family buys its support from the 
political elite with lavish gifts.14  For Habib, the most important economy is the fourth, the 
military economy, which he argues accounts for 70 percent of North Korea’s domestic 
output.15 Not only does the military generate revenue from the sale of military technology 
and arms, but the military also owns several firms and entire production chains involving 
farms, fisheries, and textile factories.16 Finally, Habib describes a fifth, entrepreneurial 
economy, made up of the markets that ordinary citizens  have constructed as a source of 
income and as a place to consume commodities. Similar to Greitens, Habib holds that the 
interactions of these economies with each other and the state have influenced domestic 
relationships inside of the DPRK.  
This thesis classifies North Korean private economies in a similar manner, drawing 
on the literature presented here by both Greitens and Habib but modifying their categories 
in an attempt to better capture the current conditions of the North Korean state. Similar to 
Greitens, the case will be made that two parallel economies exist outside of the command 
economy: an ordinary citizen economy, which will be referred to as the jangmadang 
(market) economy, and an elite economy, with components that have military and political 
elites, respectively, at their cores.  
These distinctions are based on the different types of resources available to each 
subset of social actors. The jangmadang economy is dominated by mostly-small means of 
local production, private plots, and small volumes of smuggling. Meanwhile, political elites 
have access to state resources which can be exploited to profit both the regime and 
themselves personally. The military similarly has access to many state resources, but the 
military has particularly benefited from North Korea’s comparatively recent songun 
(“military first”) policy, which provided it an uneven amount of state funding, its own labor 
 
13 Habib, 154.  
14 Habib, 154. 
15 Habib, 153. 
16 Habib, 153. 
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force (the million man army), and preferential treatment, beginning under the reign of Kim 
Jong Il in the late 1990s. Contrary to Habib’s categorization, this thesis does not set aside 
the illicit economy as its own category, because many of these economic actors deal with 
both licit and illicit activities in unison. Conversely, this thesis departs from Greitens’ 
grouping all elites together. Lumping political and military elites together ignores the 
expanded influence of the military under Kim Jong Il and the intra-elite competition for 
state resources that the current system has fostered.  
9 
II. THE COMMAND ECONOMY: STRUCTURE AND 
COLLAPSE  
North Korea is typically characterized as a destitute country.  With an annual GDP 
amongst the lowest in the world (in terms of both its absolute and per capita amounts), 
there is good reason for such a label. During the first few decades of the country’s 
existence, though, North Korea’s economy was robust in many ways. The DPRK was the 
more affluent of the two states on the Korean peninsula, reflecting not only the fact that 
South Korea’s economy was previously vastly weaker than it is today, but also the stronger 
condition of the North Korean economy itself. Cha, in his discussion of the North Korean 
economy, describes the initial years after the formation of the state as “the Best Days” of 
the North Korean regime, built upon a foundation of a plethora of state of the art industrial 
facilities left over from Japanese occupation and inherited by North Korea (with some 
amount of wartime degradation) upon the close of the war in 1945.17 The DPRK held 72  
percent of the Korean peninsula’s heavy industrial capacity and 92 percent of its 
hydroelectric capacity.18  Although it was by no means an economic powerhouse, North 
Korea was reasonably successful, both by the standards of communist economies at the 
time and in comparison to its neighbor to the south.  
A. HOW THE COMMAND ECONOMY WORKED  
Much of North Korea’s industrial advantage over its southern counterpart was 
decimated in the Korean War, when much of the DPRK’s infrastructure was leveled by 
American forces. The effort to rebuild the North’s industrial capacity would set a precedent 
for economic support by the two major communist states of the time: China and the Soviet 
Union. Cha summarizes this policy:  
Kim Il-sung received heavy industrial equipment, power plants, 
hydroelectric dams, electrified railroads, and irrigation systems from Soviet 
benefactors. China offered crude oil, food, and fertilizer. North Korea 
 
17 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future,( 1st ed. New York: Ecco,. 
2012.), 28. 
18 Cha, 28.  
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gained additional currency by exporting gold, zinc, steel, and minerals to 
both Moscow and Beijing.19 
Sino-Soviet relations would deteriorate quickly, but the KWP developed what Lankov calls 
its “ equidistant policy,” in which, for most of the pre-famine era, it was able to balance 
concessions (or lack thereof) to the two states in an effort to maximize aid from each.20 
The support of both the USSR and the PRC would become crucial to propping up the 
DPRKs economy moving forward.  
Domestically, every aspect of the command economy was controlled by the state, 
like many other communist countries. As a means to control production, every business 
became property of the DPRK. As Lankov notes, “between 1956 and 1958 small private 
workshops were nationalized, while all farmers were pressed to join agricultural 
cooperatives.”21Since every business was state-owned, every job was also controlled and 
provided by the state. Every able-bodied man and woman (who did not marry and become 
a full time housewife) was expected to work in some capacity and was more than likely 
employed in a state-owned factory.22Additionally, farmers were only allowed to farm the 
collective fields, and not able to maintain a private plot.23 In summary, these measures 
allowed the KWP to have complete control over of the means of production throughout the 
state.  
Citizens were also entirely dependent on the state for all their consumption needs. 
Most importantly, food rations were distributed through public distribution system (PDS) 
based on citizens’ respective jobs.24 When originally implemented, the PDS system 
provided the average North Korean worker a grain ration of 700 grams of grain; 
housewives were granted 300 grams, and those who participated in arduous labor were 
 
19 Victor D. Cha, The Impossible State, 30. 
20 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. 34 -35.  
21 Lankov, 52. 
22 Lankov, 52–53. 
23 Lankov, 53. 
24 Lankov, 50. 
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granted 900 grams.25 The same types of planned rationing was applied to all parts of the 
North Korean diet, making citizens dependent on the state for all of their daily subsistence. 
What would normally be described as “consumer” goods, such as electronics, were also 
distributed through the state through people’s work units as rewards for exemplary work.26 
In short, everything was supplied by the state.  
Similar to other communist economies, North Korea’s economy suffered from 
certain inherent flaws of planned economies. The communist structure does not incentivize 
maximum productivity and does not allow economies to steer themselves toward their 
comparative advantage. The state attempted to balance this lack of production by importing 
massive amounts of resources and relying on aide from the communist bloc. As mentioned 
above, China and the USSR were amongst the DPRK’s main contributors. Demick 
summarizes the DPRK’s reliance on other states:  
The country got subsidized oil, rice, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, industrial 
equipment, trucks, and cars. X-ray machines and incubators came from 
Czechoslovakia; architects from East Germany. Kim Il-sung skillfully 
played the Soviet Union and China against each other, using their rivalry to 
extract as much aid as possible.27  
The drying up of this aid due to the fall of the USSR would be a major factor in the famine 
of the mid 1990s, as discussed below.  
B. SOCIAL STRUCTURES 
As a result of the structure of the command economy, the state and the KWP  
became nearly synonymous. The KWP sought to maintain its monopoly of state control 
through many different mechanisms. The Kim family established two very rigid social 
structures (whose power began to erode in the post-famine era): a social stratification and 
classification system known as the songbun system and a patriarchally-dominated society. 
 
25 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia, 50. 
26 Lankov, 53. 
27Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, (Spiegel & Grau trade pbk.. 
ed. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010). 69.  
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Both of these hierarchical structures were intangible forces, but both were extremely 
effective in controlling the population at large.  
The Songbun System  
The songbun system allowed the state to place every single citizen into a specific 
category, and these categories ultimately determined their access to state resources. 
Hemmings, in his study of North Korea’s inner workings, breaks down the basic structure 
of this hierarchical songbun system:  
Comprising three groups (and various subcategories), the system defines 
membership to each group according to ideological loyalty to the state (and 
to the Kim family), setting the highest group as the politically loyal ‘core 
class’ (25 per cent of the population). Below this is the ‘wavering class’ (50 
per cent of the population) and below that is the ‘hostile class’ (25 per cent 
of the population).28 
One’s songbun therefore became the deciding factor in practically every interaction with 
the state. People with high songbun, or those in the loyal class, were allowed to become 
members of the KWP, were assigned the best housing, lived in the more affluent areas of 
the country, such as Pyongyang, were considered for the best schools and jobs, and had 
access to luxuries such as travel permits.29 Conversely, those classified in the lower classes 
were assigned menial work and forced to live in the outskirts of the country, far away from 
the capital and political elite.  
The songbun system classified North Korean citizens based on judgments about the 
reputation of their ancestors. Those in the hostile class might have been South Korean 
soldiers during the Korean war.30 Others might have had a great-grandfather who worked 
with the Japanese colonial government during that country’s occupation of the Korean 
peninsula.31 Both of these situations would cause a person to be classified with low 
songbun—in effect, to be classified as having tainted or “disloyal” blood. Furthermore, 
 
28John Hemmings, “Deciphering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ,” International Politics 
Review 1 (December 12, 2013): 70. https://doi.org/10.1057/ipr.2013.7. 
29 Hemmings 70. 
30 Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, 35.  
31 John Hemmings, “Deciphering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ,” 70 
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being placed in a lower songbun classification could result from a number of more present-
day infractions. Political crimes, such as taking part in market activity, were seen to be 
amongst the worst crimes and would result in the arrest of three generations of a family 
and songbun demotion.32  Naturally, this created strong incentives for North Korean 
citizens to avoid these infractions and increased the effectiveness of the songbun system as 
a tool for control for the KWP.  
The songbun system was intimately tied to the command economy. As stated 
above, those who lived in the capital, Pyongyang, were amongst the most affluent in the 
state. More generally, those with the best songbun were allowed to live in cities which took 
priority when it came to resources, especially food, but also when it came to luxury and 
comfort items. Logically, of course, the opposite could be said for members of “the 
wavering class.”  Those of “tainted blood” (beidsun) were particularly locked into their 
inferior social—and thereby political and economic—position.33  The songbun system was 
extremely rigid in terms of upward mobility:  almost no amount of effort at school or work 
could alter this categorization or its effects.34  Demick, for example, tells the story of Mi-
Hee (the pseudonym of an eventual defector to South Korea), who, despite being the most 
talented singer in her town, was not admitted to any performing arts schools because of her 
father’s past as a South Korean solider.35  
The songbun system allowed the command economy to dictate domestic 
relationships within the state as well. Though all citizens depended on the state for their 
food, money, and any luxury commodities, the particular degree to which they could expect 
state support was determined by their songbun status, which implied that citizens had no 
other option than complete loyalty to the state and the system. At a higher level, beyond 
subsistence, political elites needed the state in order to advance and enjoy the luxury items 
which are afforded to only those most loyal to the state. Military elites also needed the 
 
32 John Hemmings, “Deciphering the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ,” 70 
33 Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea, 31. 
34 Demick, 31. 
35 Demick, 33. 
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good favor of the state and Kim regime in order to secure resources. Political elites, military 
elites, alongside average citizens, were effectively incorporated within the songbun system, 
in a command economy that attempted to scrupulously reward those deemed the most loyal 
to the regime.  
Women’s Work  
Historically, the DPRK has been a male-dominated society. Women had very little 
in the way of social, political, or economic status, as “the father and husband [we]re 
expected to be the breadwinners and decision makers of the household.”36 Lankov 
describes the typical role of women in the North Korea as follows:  
It was a common assumption in the Kim Il Sung-era North Korea that 
women should not aspire to have careers in politics or administration. The 
common wisdom was that a girl should look for a proper husband and, if 
possible, for a job that would leave her enough time to fulfill her primary 
duties as a mother, wife, and daughter-in-law.37 
Evidence of this standard is rampant throughout the pre-famine era. Almost all of the 
highly-appointed women in politics could attribute their good career fortune to their 
membership in the ruling Kim family.38 This trend would change dramatically during the 
famine and the post famine period—that is, at least, at the level of average citizens, even if 
not at the elite level. 
C. THE FAMINE 
The famine that plagued the DPRK during the 1990s reflected the inherent flaws of 
planned economies, discussed earlier, but was exacerbated by the changing—and 
deteriorating—international environment surrounding the North Korean regime. Haggard 
summarizes the “perfect storm” that led to the catastrophe: 
The causes of this collapse were multiple, including long-run distortions 
associated with the socialist growth model…. The failure to adjust to the 
 
36 Baek, Jieun. North Korea’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground Is Transforming 
a Closed Society, 64. 
37 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinst Utopia, 40. 
38 Lankov, 42 
15 
rapid decline of Soviet support is the principal reason both the industrial 
and agricultural sectors of North Korea went into a secular decline in the 
first half of the 1990s. The floods of 1995 were only a final shock.39 
Although, the fall of the Soviet Union and the stoppage of the resources provided by that 
political patron was certainly a hard blow for North Korea, the USSR had begun to reduce 
its aid to the state well before its collapse, and the DPRK refused to make the proper 
adjustments.  
Additionally, Cha points to the regime’s poor economic policy choices, its crippling 
debt, and natural disasters as other significant sources of the eventual famine. The KWP’s  
policies emphasized  ideology that heroically assumed the state could overcome production 
shortfalls simply through more effort from its citizens.40 This movement to make up for 
low production with “revolutionary zeal” only compounded the negative effects produced 
by the shortcomings of the planned economy.41  Arguably the most important shock to 
North Korea’s economy was the loss of its last major benefactor upon the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. The DPRK was highly dependent upon aid and discounts from the 
Soviet Union, which came to a complete halt in 1991 when the country fell.42   By this 
time, all other states, including the communist bloc of Europe, China, and western states 
such as France and the UK, who helped to prop up North Korea’s economy had begun to 
not only recall its debts but also refuse to allow the regime to borrow money (though other 
forms of trade did continue). Cha notes that the DPRK was able to secure 1.2 billion dollars 
in loans before other countries realized the regime was unable and unwilling to repay these 
loans.43 Finally, natural disasters exacerbated these issues.44 Cha identifies several of these 
disasters: 
The August 1995 floods basically broke the back of the North Korean 
economy and led to the great famine. It destroyed the four western provinces 
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in the North and wiped out about 70 percent of the annual rice harvest and 
over 50 percent of the maize harvest.45 
The combination of these adverse conditions would prove literally deadly to the North 
Korean people and figuratively so to crucial institutions in the command economy.  
At the height of the famine, malnutrition, starvation, and infertility are assumed to 
have caused between 600,000 and one million deaths.46 Concurrently with drastic 
mortality increases, overall standards of living dropped, as factories closed and even the 
simplest of necessities, such as electricity, became a luxury.47 By 2000, both agricultural 
and industrial output had dropped to half their 1990 levels.48 Since then, North Korea has 
become synonymous with poverty. The famine crippled the effectiveness of many of the 
economic institutions at the foundation of the command economy. The rationing system 
stopped, jobs could no longer provide salaries, and people were forced to find new ways 
of finding food and  money.49As a result, the economy, which had historically been 
dominated by the state, made way for large vibrant sectors of private activity.  
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III. JANGMADANG ECONOMY  
The breakdown of the fundamental institutions of the command economy because 
of the famine forced average citizens to find new ways to acquire their basic necessities. 
None of these institutions was a more important loss than that of the Private Distribution 
System (PDS). After the dissolution of the PDS, the majority of early market activity was 
centered around the trade of food. Markets spread quickly and began to transition from 
trading to selling as more and more citizens were forced to fend for themselves. By the 
time the worst years of the famine has passed, markets had begun to encompass a variety 
of commodities, including electronics and other luxury items. It is estimated that “the 
private sector now produces between 25 and 50 percent of North Korea’s estimated 
GDP.”50  Lankov notes, “In 2012, refugees agree that the survival income for a family of 
three or four is 50,000 won (some $15 according to the current exchange rate)—roughly 
10 times the official salary.”51 Although markets were born out of necessity, and possibly 
allowed to remain open because the state saw them as a temporary evil during the famine, 
they have since grown into a sophisticated economy outside of the official planned 
economy, with their own rules and norms.   
A. SEARCHING FOR FOOD  
At the height of the famine, farmers’ markets were amongst the first to develop as 
a new normal institution for the purchasing and selling of crops. Farmers siphoned off 
crops from collective farms and misappropriated food aid stocks to sell in these private 
markets.52  Additionally, farmers who lived further away from political centers, and thus 
were subject to less oversight, were able to find alternative arable lands to cultivate away 
from collective fields.53 As Lankov describes, “A quick look at a satellite picture shows 
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the presence of numerous small fields of irregular shapes and sizes located in the 
mountains.”54 Although it was illegal to sell food—specifically, any type of grains—these 
crops began to trickle into markets, to be bought and bartered for by starving North Korean 
citizens.55 Much of this rural activity was initiated in the northeastern region of the DPRK, 
which was the region both most severely affected by the famine and the furthest away from 
Pyongyang, thus creating an area in which people were highly incentivized to break the 
laws while also having a smaller fear of retribution.56 
In contrast to the countryside, urban areas lacked the resources to begin private 
plots and developed different private market activity. Starvation once again being a driving 
factor, urban markets began to be a place where non-essential household items were sold 
or exchanged for food.57 Many citizens saw these exchanges as temporary, but as a 
necessary evil, having full faith that the PDS would return and the command economy 
would resume.58  As with their rural counterparts, cities, and towns in the northeast region 
of North Korea were where the majority of urban marketization began. Once people began 
to run out of personal items to barter, people turned to stealing from others or to stealing 
items like copper wiring from shuttered state factories.59   
An important element of both rural and urban markets was the fact that the vast 
majority of the trading and selling of goods was conducted by women. The dominance of 
women in the markets was a huge development in North Korea. As discussed above, the 
DPRK has historically been an extremely patriarchal society, but as a result of the 
emergence of private markets, in many cases women became the primary earners in their 
households.60  Lankov notes the difference between other Communist black markets and 
what developed in the DPRK:  
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Market vendors in North Korea are by no means the kind of street toughs 
one might encounter in black markets of other countries. Instead, they are 
largely housewives who make and sell in order to keep their family alive.61  
This development will be discussed below as well with regard to the changing social 
dynamics in North Korea brought on by the economic shifts in the country. 
B. MARKETIZATION GROWS  
Marketization quickly began to spread from the northeast region of the DPRK to 
the rest of the country. As these markets began to grow and spread, the commodities 
available became more diverse. Some market vendors began to make a shift away from 
serving purely as straightforward traders, bartering off household items and scavenged 
materials, into serving as small entrepreneurs, selling items produced from their limited 
resources.62 Demick recounts a story of a DPRK woman,  (the pseudonymously named) 
Mrs. Song, who reluctantly became a market vendor after suffering years of strife brought 
on by the famine.63 Mrs. Song and her daughter were quickly able to make a sustainable 
living from selling cookies, providing both small amounts of income to facilitate their 
business and food that allowed them not to become another starvation fatality.64 It was 
through this same process that many other North Korean citizens, most of whom were 
women, began to transform themselves into capitalists—arguably in spirit as well as in 
behavior.  
As markets became more complex, demand for luxury items rose as well. The 
demand for electronics for entertainment is one of the best examples of how North Korean 
markets have transformed from places for the acquisition of necessary items into sources 
of all types of consumption goods. Electronics such as TVs, DVD players, cell phones,  
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and computers have all become status symbols for North Korean citizens.65 Additionally, 
markets providing these electronics have caused the DPRK to be flooded with foreign 
media and information.66 Smuggled South Korean movies and dramas are now wildly 
popular in the North Korean state.67 As markets have grown and spread, the number of 
available commodities have grown and spread as well.  
C. SMUGGLING  
Where do these products come from? How do TV sets make it to a North Korean 
market when they are not being produced in the DPRK? In 1996, during the worst stages 
of the famine, crossing the Chinese border was recategorized as a minor offense, and 
political crimes no longer resulted in the arrest of one’s entire family.68 As some citizens 
began to make the transition from local traders to local producers, other citizens realized 
the possible monetary gains to be found in acquiring Chinese products and selling them in 
North Korean markets. The relaxing of the law removed much of the risk associated with 
these crimes. Therefore, smuggling became a huge component of the jangmadang 
economy.  
The North Korean-Chinese border did not become a free-for-all, though. Smugglers 
still had to be careful, and in most instances they were required to bribe guards and lower-
level officials in order to maintain their businesses.69 However, the new norm of bribing 
officials simply increased the number of people willing to cross the border for goods. 
Smugglers knew that bribes were just the price of doing business. Some early smugglers 
would eventually move into a wholesaling role, paying large bribes to move large sums of 
goods across the border with the help of the guards whose official role is to attempt to stop 
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such activities.70 Among those who began to accumulate the capital and resources to 
become wholesalers, many found themselves in this position because of their connections 
to Chinese, Japanese, or South Korean relatives.71 These connections, which under the 
songbun system had been a curse, now became a blessing. Foreign contacts began helping 
small-time entrepreneurs produce very successful businesses that operated in markets 
around the country. In total, then, smuggling became an important piece of the jangmadang 
economy.  
D. THE STATE REACTS TO MARKETIZATION 
The DPRK’s relationship with black and grey markets is a confusing one because 
it follows a cyclical path instead of a linear one. Initially, facing a starving population 
during one of the worst famines in recorded history, the state chose to ignore the 
development of black and grey markets in most cases.72 In some cases, citizens were even 
encouraged by local officials to develop private land plots and participate in market 
activity.73  During this period, authorities would sometimes enforce crackdowns on 
markets, only to expeditiously reopen them once the food shortage returned.74 As North 
Korea came out of the worst years of the famine and began to recover (by North Korean 
standards), the state was forced to deal with the issue of markets because they had grown 
too large and widespread to ignore.  
When the state finally acknowledged the existence of these black markets, it first 
appeared as if the DPRK would choose a path of reform similar to that of the PRC. The 
KWP, cautiously avoiding the use of the word “reform” in its rhetoric, introduced the  
“Economic Management Improvement Measures of 1st July” in 2002.75 This plan lifted 
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bans on market activity, including the legalization of the sale of garments and consumer 
electronics.76 Additionally, some State-Owned Enterprise managers were given a degree 
of autonomy over their employees and operations.77  
The KWP made an abrupt shift in policy following these attempts at reform. From 
2005 to 2009, DPRK officials passed a number of regulations aimed at reining in market 
activity throughout the state.78 As Hastings writes, “In August 2005, the central state issued 
regulations designed to bring the private markets to heel, discourage cross-border (private) 
trade, and return ordinary citizens to at least partial dependence on the Public Distribution 
System.”79 In 2007, the state banned women under age fifty from selling goods in the 
markets and limited the allowable commodities sold in markets to domestic products.80  
Finally, in 2009 the state redenominated its won currency to 1/100 of its original value, 
essentially causing many households’ life savings to plummet to zero.81 Similar to attempts 
at instituting reform, though, attempts to return to a command economy proved equally 
unsuccessful. The currency redenomination, in particular, was a huge failure, to the extent 
that even North Korea’s normally officially-infallible government officials were unable to 
avoid admitting fault. The prime minister issued a public apology, and the regime even 
went as far as executing a minister-level KWP member, using him as a scapegoat for the 
policy after uncharacteristically visible public discontent.82  
Following the currency reform blunder, state officials began to turn a blind eye 
towards market activity once again. Most evidence suggests that a policy of indifference 
continues today: no regulations which would greatly hinder private business have been 
produced in the Kim Jong Un era, and there has been some suggestion that local officials 
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have been encouraged to cooperate with entrepreneurs.83 Therefore, after a period of 
reforms and crackdowns, the official DPRK stance on markets has returned to its original 
stance of ambivalence and quiet assistance or encouragement.  
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IV. ELITE ECONOMY 
Elites took a much different approach to their famine crisis response, for two 
principal reasons. First, it took much longer for the effects of the economic crisis to reach 
elites. Demick, for example, recounts the story of Jun-Sang (a pseudonym), a university 
student who was studying in the capital city of Pyongyang. She describes how, while 
involved in his studies at school, Jun-Sang always had enough to eat and electricity, but on 
his return trips to his hometown was faced with the harsh realities of the famine.84 This 
was because major cities had always enjoyed priority distribution of resources, especially 
food (and there is no city was more important than the capital city of Pyongyang). Second, 
both military and political elites had access to state resources that far outweighed any 
access available to the average citizen. Greitens argues, “Opportunistic elites, faced with 
crisis, leveraged access to what would normally be considered state resources … in order 
to engage in business operations to generate revenue for themselves and for the regime in 
Pyongyang.”85 At the direction of these opportunistic elites, many industries have become 
semi-privatized.  
Elites who participate in these semiprivate industries have been able to amass 
substantial amounts of personal wealth. This has created a demand for leisure activities 
such swimming in water parks(Figure 2). Elites in Pyongyang for example, now have the 
opportunity to enjoy ski resorts within the city, to go and sing karaoke, and take yoga 
classes.86 Only a relatively small group of North Korean elites are affluent enough for these 
activities, but  they have been able to acquire the revenue to do so through exploitation of 
state resources . 
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Figure 2. People gathered at North Korean Water Park87 
It is worthwhile to discuss what the term elite means in the North Korean context. 
One group to note is the small contingent of North Korean citizens who made their 
beginnings in the jangmadang economy, but who then were able to accumulate enough 
capital to make the leap into more profitable sectors of the private economy. These 
entrepreneurs were able to establish “state owned” businesses in which they themselves 
were essentially empowered to make all relevant decisions and keep the lion’s share of the 
profits. These North Korean citizens have transformed themselves into a new monied class 
of North Korean citizens known as the donju.88 These donju, or “masters of money,” are 
North Korean businesspeople who have been able to manipulate the DPRK system to make 
thousands and even hundreds of thousands of dollars for themselves—a huge sum by North 
Korean standards.89  
The more common use of the word elite applies when discussing high-ranking 
members of the military and KWP. These elites run semi-private state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) that are involved in international trade as well as massive domestic production. A 
decade of songun (“military first”) policy has allowed military elites to consume more than 
their fair share of state resources, but the various groups of elites do compete for the same 
resources and participate in many of the same industries. Additionally, relationships 
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between these two sets of elites and the state are critical to the regime and have changed 
drastically over the transition from Kim Jong Il’s to Kim Jong Un’s rule. The bulk of this 
section will discuss how political and military elites have developed their economic 
position in the post-famine period.  
A. THE MASTERS OF MONEY  
As mentioned above, some DPRK citizens became so successful that they began to 
branch out from the smaller-scale jangmadang economy into other enterprises—many of 
which were state-owned in name but privately owned in practice—and in the process have 
transformed themselves into the donju.90 The restaurant industry represents a significant 
example of this type of establishment. Lankov summarizes this complex  relationship as 
follows:  
According to official papers, an eatery is owned by the state and managed 
by the relevant department of the municipal government. However, this is a 
legal fiction. A private investor makes an informal deal with municipal 
officials, promising them a kickback, and he/she then hires workers and 
buys equipment. It is assumed that a certain amount of the earnings will be 
transferred to the state’s budget. In return the private owner runs a business 
at his/her discretion, investing and protecting profits.91 
These small enterprises are extremely profitable and have elevated many from the 
jangmadang economy to an elite status.  
This same setup can be found in other sectors of the economy as well. The retail 
industry is another example of state-owned small businesses that are run and operated by 
private citizens. The state, once again, owns the retail establishment, but the manager is the 
actual owner, and it is the manager who buys textiles both from wholesale smugglers and 
state suppliers.92 Lankov describes women such as “Ms. Young,” who was once an 
engineer at a state factory and began trading dresses during the famine years, and who was 
able to expand her operations to the point of owning several clothing shops and employing 
 
90 Justin V. Hastings, A Most Enterprising Country, 54. 
91 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinst Utopia, 104. 
92 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinst Utopia, 105. 
28 
dozens of women.93 The retail industry has seen a dramatic rise in private ownership, with 
over fifty percent of retail shops in the hands of private owners by as early as 2009.94 These 
small businesses have allowed North Korean citizens who once occupied the lowest rungs 
of society to climb the economic ladder.  
Many more examples of these kinds of businesses can be found scattered 
throughout Pyongyang. Lankov notes, “Donju run businesses within North Korea’s state-
owned enterprises, quasi-autonomous ventures that a bankrupt state tolerates in exchange 
for a chunk of the profits.”95 These businesses range from coffee shops to saunas to 
restaurants and everything in between.96 Although the extreme privation faced in North 
Korea might lead one to imagine otherwise, North Korean families do—when able—go to 
local coffee shops for cake and ice cream.97 These experiences are only enjoyed by a select 
few, but they are worth noting for their similarities with their much larger elite 
counterparts. 
B. POLITICAL ELITES  
These tales of semi-independently achieving the North Korean dream should not 
be considered the standard, however. Having connections to the KWP has always provided 
advantages within the DPRK and still continues to today. In 1974, the party founded the 
Daesung Trading Company and the Daesung bank, which were kept under its control, 
separate from the state, and with the specific purpose of engaging in trade to provide 
resources for the party.98 As the state gave more and more control of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) away to other players, the KWP has been able to use these two 
institutions, and many other enterprises, to expand their economic holdings and influence. 
 
93 Lankov, 112–113.  
94 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinst Utopia, 105. 
95 “Bread and Circuses; North Korea’s New Monied Classes,” The Economist, Aug 08, 2015, 31–
32,http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/
1702693995?accountid=12702. 
96 “Bread and Circuses; North Korea’s New Monied Classes,”  
97 “Bread and Circuses; North Korea’s New Monied Classes.” 
98 Byung- Yeon Kim, Unveiling the North Korean Economy, 125. 
29 
In particular, these provided an avenue for KWP members to easily access the trading 
licenses created by the state as a new control mechanism, and this provides huge advantage 
over other citizens in the state.99 Before discussing the types of companies under the 
control of the KWP,  it is important to establish, more generally, what control the state gave 
away in the post-famine years and how Kim Jong Un and the regime has attempted to 
control these institutions indirectly.  
SOE Decentralization  
The state began loosening its grip on SOEs starting as early as the 1980s, but the 
famine exacerbated this decentralization, as the state no longer had its previously-existing 
power to control these firms. Kim describes how SOE have gone through a decentralization 
process in which the state has relinquished control to several different actors. He identifies 
three different phases of decentralization: First, ownership of several large trading firms 
was transferred from the state to provincial governments and cabinet institutions, but this 
phase affected only a small number of firms, and the central planning committee still set 
these companies’ inputs and output quotas.100 In the second phase, firms that could engage 
in trade directly with other countries were established by ministries and other committees 
outside of the central government.101 Finally, in the third phase, permission to engage in 
foreign trade was expanded to include not only large trading firms, but also cities and 
counties; and all three could then sell their imported commodities directly to consumers.102 
The final phase of decentralization, coming in 2002, was perhaps the most important, as it 
empowered even lower-level officials to engage in foreign trade.  
The loosening of control by the state opened the door for several different actors to 
expand their influence by earning money outside of the command economy in the name of 
the state. Kim names four different entities as having become more influential: the army, 
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the Worker’s Party, the cabinet, and regional governments.103From this perspective, the 
army (which will be discussed at length below) and the KWP have emerged as beneficiaries 
of the new system. The relenting of control not only over these institutions themselves, but 
even over the quotas that govern them, meant the regime would have to devise other 
methods of control or be eventually find itself removed from these institutions’ operations 
entirely. For that reason, SOEs are required to compete for trading licenses that are granted 
by the North Korean regime.   
The Waku  
The Kim regime looked to maintain some control over foreign trade and firms by 
issuing trading licenses, or waku, which designates those eligible to trade and dictates the 
allowable amount of goods to be traded.104 SOEs applying for a trading license have to 
demonstrate access to foreign business partners, sufficient capital, a viable business plan, 
facilities (factories, farms, and research institutes), and resources that actually allow 
production and export.105 Amassing the collection of items on this list would be nearly 
impossible for average citizens and is presumably difficult even for most of the smaller 
entrepreneurs in the state. However, for political elites who already have access to these 
resources and some form of access to Kim Jong Un, who serves as the ultimate decider on 
waku distribution, obtaining these trading licenses is relatively easy.106 In this manner, the 
KWP has been able to greatly expand its economic influence through its many SOE and 
trading companies.  
Although Kim Jong Un makes the decisions on who receives trading licenses, once 
a company or induvial obtains one, they do have the ability to extend that license to other 
businesses or individuals. Hastings summarizes this relationship below:  
While companies cannot buy or sell the licenses themselves, once granted 
the ability to export a certain quantity of goods from a certain area, a trading 
company can rent out any unused quota… The fee cited by some sources is 
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around 10 percent of the value of the exports. This allows the officially 
permitted company to charge a fee for the quota’s use, while it allows the 
company actually doing the exporting to operate with some measure of 
political protection.107 
This creates a mutually beneficial relationship between larger SOEs and smaller 
businesses; and because it is easier to obtain a waku as a KWP member, it is easier for 
lower-level officials to obtain leftover quota amounts as a way to legitimize their business 
practices. A system is created in which money is funneled upwards to top-tier KWP 
officials building upon profits from the sale of goods and resources.  
KWP SOEs  
As a result, the types KWP members controlling SOEs span a large spectrum from 
lower-level elites to the very top of the regime. For example, Lankov describes a “Mr. 
Kim,” once a low-level police official, who acquired a large amount of capital by taking 
bribes, and who then went into business with a cousin who had made a vast amount of 
money through smuggling tobacco.108 The two were then able to bribe their way into 
operating a gold mine officially owned by a trading company, but in reality owned and 
operated by Mr. Kim and his family—that is, allowed to be owned at the price of a fee paid 
to the state.109 Through his political connections to the KWP, Mr. Kim is now the proud 
“owner” of an extremely profitable gold mine.  
On the other end of the spectrum sits Ri Jong Ho (again, a pseudonym). Ri began 
his work in Office 39, the component of the North Korean bureaucracy responsible, as part 
of the command economy, for providing Kim Jong Il with his luxury money in the 
1980s.110 Fifield describes his work resumé before his defection from North Korea in 
2014:  
His last job was in the Chinese port city of Dalian, not far from the border 
with North Korea, where he was the head of a branch of Taehung, a North 
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Korean trading company involved in shipping, coal and seafood exports, 
and oil imports. He had previously been president of a ship-trading 
company and chairman of Korea Kumgang Group, a company that formed 
a venture with Sam Pa, a Chinese businessman, to start a taxi company in 
Pyongyang.111 
As the head of these companies, Ri was able to make millions of dollars for the regime . 
Over the span of about nine months, Ri sent approximately 10 million dollars back to the 
state.112 How much he made for himself is unknown; but as Fifield points out, Ri must 
have made a good sum of money, as he now resides comfortably in the Virginia suburbs 
with his family.113 More important and general, political connections allow a wide 
spectrum of elites, from lower-level officials to higher-ranking ones, to run extremely 
profitable enterprises that also then funnel money back to the party and the state.  
C. MILITARY ELITES  
Just as the KWP emerged from the famine as a major economic player, so did the 
North Korean military. Political elites and military elites resemble each other in many 
ways. Both have come to own major trading companies and, because of their elevated 
status in the country, have a relatively easy path toward gaining coveted trading licenses. 
However, two factors separate military elites from their political elite counterparts. First, 
is the military-first doctrine of songun that was pushed by then-leader Kim Jong Il 
beginning in the 1990s. This doctrine made the military the primary recipient (that is, even 
more so than previously) of the relatively small pool of resources the state did have in the 
post-Soviet era. Secondly, the military benefits from controlling a large labor force of 
immobilized soldiers, who essentially remain at its disposal for employment in military 
SOEs and trading companies. It is important to note that the KWP, as opposed to the 
military itself, does have some ability to use the military (and the public at large) as its 
personal labor force. The fact that the military enjoys  a massive labor force under its direct 
control, though, is a decided advantage.  
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Songun 
Songun, or the “military first” policy, was introduced by Kim Jong Il in 1995 while 
he was giving a speech to a military unit.114 That Kim Jong Il sought to rally the North 
Korean people through a cry for a strong military was no coincidence during the height of 
the famine, as the regime was undoubtedly concerned for its survival (or, at least, more 
concerned than was normal, even if not as concerned as one might expect amid famine-
driven devastation on such a large scale). More important to this topic of discussion was 
the aim of the military first policy:  to create an economy that could support a military with 
the ability to defend North Korea’s sovereignty from foreign invasion.115 Smith 
summarizes how the military interacted with the markets: “The institutionalization of 
military-first politics embedded a national security mentality such that economic policy 
was subordinated to a militarized understanding of national security.”116 Songun became 
institutionalized as one of North Korea’s major guiding principles for both foreign and 
domestic policy until the rise of Kim Jong Un.  
As a result of the songun policy, the military received the majority of the state’s 
resources and funding. It is hard to obtain accurate data about the North Korean economy, 
but according the Bank of Korea, the DPRK GDP experienced some degree of minor ebb 
and flow of GDP growth and decline following the country’s recovery from famine from 
1999 onwards.117 During this time, defense spending remained at around 15 percent of 
government spending and therefore, the military received priority distribution of resources 
which could have been used to help revitalize a struggling economy—a military, which, as 
Smith points out, was “the best-resourced and best-organized political and social institution 
in the world.”118 As stated earlier, political elites’ access to resources allowed them to 
more easily establish credible SOEs and apply for a waku. As part of the best funded and 
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resourced institution, military elites were decidedly advantaged as they looked to capitalize 
on the new economic order.  
Additionally, the military first policy also resulted in an influx of men into the 
military. The official DPRK policy towards military service was the following:  
Those who are healthy, able-bodied, sane and have no family problems are 
selected from among the volunteers and are educated in full-time military 
or technical educational institutes for one to two years before being posted 
to units as servicemen on active duty.119 
Of course, this was not the North Korean regime’s actual stance. In practice, most military-
aged males were expected to serve their time in the armed forces.120 This has meant that 
although the DPRK is one of the world’s poorest countries, and not a particularly large one 
in terms of population (approximately 25 million), it has the fourth-largest standing army 
in the world, with 1.1 million members and 7.5 million reservists.121 Military elites have 
used many of these troops as their own ready labor force, enjoying a large and particularly 
compliant pool of labor for their many SOEs, such as construction projects in 
Pyongyang.122  
Military SOEs 
Similar to the KWP, the military controlled its own economic institutions outside 
of the official command economy, even in pre-famine years. In 1970, the Second Economy 
Committee was established.123This commission took charge of all military-related 
economic issues, merged several different organizations under the umbrella of the defense 
industry, which was then able to produce and export military commodities.124 The Second 
Economy Committee was officially independent of the KWP and its centrally planned 
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economy, thereby allowing military elites some limited form of autonomy.125 In the wake 
of the famine, the decentralization of control of SOEs and songun policies would combine 
to allow the military to expand its economic holdings and influence as it obtained numerous 
companies.  
As the decentralization of control of SOEs was occurring, Kim Jong Il’s songun 
policy  resulted in 100 military officials being  appointed as delegates of the Tenth People’s 
Assembly, a 100 percent increase from the previous assembly.126  In a relative short 
amount of time, “The Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces established companies to 
engage in foreign trade, mining, and farming, drawing particularly on their transportation 
and infrastructure assets to move goods to export.127 As North Korea began to recover 
from the effects of the famine in the early 2000s, military companies were in control of 
many of the most important enterprises, such as sea ports.128 Particularly in the mining 
industry, the military was granted extensive trading rights by Kim Jong Il.129 Military 
officials were able to use their official positions to obtain the necessary licenses to advance 
their economic holdings as a result of the rise in the political influence and the economic 
turbulence created by the great famine. Conversely, Kim Jong Un has taken deliberate steps 
to reduce the influence and power of the military, tipping the balance of power back in 
favor of the KWP—but the military’s economic advantages compared to other potential 
private economic actors in North Korea remain. 
D. BLURRED LINES 
These differences among elites are significant and help to shape the economic 
landscape of the DPRK, but military elites and political elites both participate in many of 
the same types of enterprises. In some cases, the enterprises are working in unison to 
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produce revenue for the state. Local officials and military members, such as border guards, 
often collaborate for monetary gain.130 On a larger scale, drug and counterfeit currency 
production have been linked to high-ranking state officials and members of the military.131 
North Korean military vessels have been accused of dropping narcotics at sea, for pick-up 
by Japanese crime syndicates, with a degree of potency and purity only capable of being 
produced at state-owned laboratories.132 North Korean embassies and KWP officials were 
also accused of  distributing the “Super Note,” a sophisticated counterfeit currency note, 
as well as narcotics.133 Military and KWP elites participate in many of the same sectors of 
the economy, and so determining which of these elite actors has gained control of the bigger 
slice of the post-famine industrial pie can prove difficult. 
Furthermore, both sets of elites are required to provide revenue back to the state—
and ultimately back to Kim Jong Un. For this purpose, SOEs transfer a certain percentage 
of their profits to the “Revolutionary Fund,” a fund of foreign currencies directly controlled 
by Kim Jong Un for whatever purpose he deems fit.134 These funds are collected in a 
number of ways:  
For example, an army organisation may dispatch a businessperson to 
conduct business with companies in China. This businessperson, who is 
called ‘foreign currency earner’ (oihwabeoligun), is required to send a 
certain amount of foreign currency to the state institution, which then gives 
part of this currency to the leader. Another example is when trading 
companies, or institutions to which such companies belong, offer a part of 
their foreign currency earnings to the leader.135 
These contributions to the Revolutionary Fund provide Kim Jong Un with hard currency 
to buy luxury goods unavailable to the rest of the population. This fund also provides Kim 
with a form of control over the activities of these elites, although this represents only  
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indirect control. Since the leader ultimately both decides whom waku are awarded to, 
indirectly controlling inputs, and requires a remittance from these firms, indirectly 
controlling their outputs, Kim can play a dominant role in the elite economy and create 
strife and competition between military and political elites.136 These intra-elite competitive 
dynamics have been particularly intense since Kim Jong Un came to power and began to 
attempt to reduce the role of military (relative, that is, to its role at the height of songun). 
These intertwining relationships will be discussed further below.  
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V. DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
In an eye-opening scene from the documentary North Korea: Life Inside the Secret 
State, a woman who is operating a transportation service berates an army officer who 
attempts to stop her from conducting business (Figure 3).137 “You bastard! You asshole!” 
she screams, as she shoves him out of her way to continue on her route with an apparently 
not-fully-authorized truck full of North Korean citizens.138 This scene strikes many as 
impossible:  most newsworthy stories published about North Korea tell the story of an 
abusive state terrorizing its citizens and give the impression that the populace is entirely 
unable (and perhaps unwilling) to carry out even minor, day-to-day acts of resistance. How 
is it, then, that this woman is allowed to essentially attack an officer without being snatched 
into a proverbial black van?  
 
Figure 3. Woman attacks army officer 
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Meanwhile, in the same documentary, a woman in an elegant dress steps out of a 
luxury car on her wedding day. The narrator describes her as a member of the elite who 
inhabit the capital—that is, “elite” in the everyday sense of the term, connoting high social 
status and wealth (as opposed to simply “elite” in the more generic political science sense 
connoting those with significant advantages of political power or knowledge). Although 
many elites have been able to acquire their fair share of capital in North Korea’s new 
economic system, as described above, this does not explain how such elites find themselves 
able to procure a Mercedes in, or to, North Korea. The competition between elites to earn 
capital for the state, and for themselves in the process, is fierce. This chapter will examine 
how economic change in North Korea has driven change in the different social cleavages 
and power relationships discussed thus far throughout this thesis.  
A. STATE VS EVERYDAY CITIZENS  
Jang Jin Sung, the former chief propagandist for North Korea (and subsequently a 
defector), described the ruling Kim family’s portrayal within North Korea in the following 
terms: “They promote the leader as the Sun. They say if you get too close you burn to 
death; if you go too far you freeze to death.”139 Starting with Kim Il Sung, and continuing 
through his two hereditary successors, the North Korean regime has grown extremely 
skilled at making the leader of the state look god-like. In The Interview, a fictional comedy 
about news reporters who are granted the opportunity to interview Kim Jong Un, the 
movie’s main characters joke about a rumor the North Korean leader does not have to the 
need to relieve himself in the same way as a normal person. This seems like satire—but 
Jang Jin Sung also mentioned the North Korea people believed Kim does not use the 
toilet.140The state’s propaganda machine was a very powerful and effective tool for the 
regime. However, for average citizens, who during the famine were left to survive on their 
own, sometimes literally left to freeze to death in the cold, the famine served to help break 
down the illusion of the Kim family set forth by the state. As state institutions like the PDS 
broke down and markets rose to take their place, DPRK citizens gained some level of self-
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sufficiency in the absence of the state and the sun—i.e., the leader. Thus, today’s North 
Korea average citizen likely has a different view of his or her relationship to the state.  
The Jangmadang Generation 
The results of citizens’ new reliance on markets instead of the state is the birth of 
what Baek refers to as the “jangmadang” or market generation.141 A whole generation of 
people now living in North Korea have never known the PDS or the state-run jobs which 
used to provide for families. The aforementioned jangmadang economy, centered around 
the development and expansion of black markets.142 To recap, the black and grey market 
activity involved the trading of resources and materials for food initially, but subsequently 
grew into markets in which almost any item can be purchased, including electronics.143 
The growth of markets has led to a diminishing of state influence.  
Most important, Baek identifies three major characteristics of this new generation: 
they are capitalist in nature, have significantly more access to information, and are much 
less loyal to the state and regime.144 She observes that this generation, growing up without 
state-provided food and salaries, has been forced to resort to their own devices to make 
money in order to secure basic necessities. This has made them capitalist in everything but 
name. The two latter characteristics are results of the former. Smuggling food leads to 
smuggling other things, such as media and information. Baek also argues that these 
citizens’ exposure to outside sources of information helps to lift the God-like veil which 
surrounds the Kim family. This in turn makes younger citizens, in particular, less loyal to 
the repressive state—but also older citizens who have now lived under these conditions for 
roughly two decades, as exemplified by the informal entrepreneur mentioned earlier with 
no fear of pushing back against police officers attempting to intrude upon her small-scale 
transportation service. 
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Furthermore, the complex cycle of crackdowns and tolerance of markets by the 
state has led to rent-seeking relationships between low-level officials and those citizens 
who operate in markets. Especially during times when the state has looked to crack down 
on markets, citizens know that bribing officials and state police can successfully lead them 
to turn a blind eye toward these practices.145 The size of the bribe depends on the size of 
activity citizens are looking to pursue, but these new norms are now accepted as a part of 
doing business in the DPRK. Consequently, market vendors and officials have developed 
an interest in maintaining the current system. Although vendors have to share some of their 
profits, the alternative would be to try and survive on the meager salaries provided by the 
state (the notion of operating fully independently likely appears more remote). On the other 
hand, officials likely have grown aware that whether the alternative to the current 
coexistence of the official and shadow economy involves crackdowns or reform, a change 
from the status quo would likely involve losing out on their currently-lucrative unofficial 
sources of income.  
The songbun system fades away  
Once result of the fraying of state institutions and market-driven adaptation has been 
that the “power of the dollar” has likely drastically risen in the eyes of everyday North 
Korean citizens. Today, North Korean citizens commonly say that “everything except a 
cat’s horn” can be bought in the market.146  This concept clashes not only with core values 
of the command-economy structure, but also with the core social-structure elements 
correlated with this economic approach, such as the songbun system. Traditionally, one’s 
songbun category was the driving factor in acquiring resources such as better housing, a 
better job, or luxuries such as travel permits. Now, as Tudor and Pearson argue,  
One can, however, buy the effects of better songbun —university places, 
coveted jobs, high-quality apartments, medical care, greater freedom of 
movement, and immunity from prosecution or harsh punishment, in most 
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cases…. Many of the growing entrepreneurial class have poor songbun , but 
it scarcely makes a difference in their lives.147 
The songbun system, once an extremely useful control tool for the state, has seen its power 
effectively stripped away and replaced by that of the almighty dollar.  
Also, in a bit of ironic justice, those who traditionally suffered from low songbun 
status were often positioned to make the biggest gains in the jangmadang economy. As 
mentioned previously, those with foreign family connections were often able to quickly 
establish themselves in the jangmadang economy because of their ability to acquire advice 
and supplies from outside the state. These citizens’ connections to areas such as Japan or 
South Korea resulted in their being categorized in the lower classes and being barred from 
the best resources under the songbun system. However, under the new, market-driven 
economic system, where everything can be bought, people with access to supply inputs and 
the knowledge needed to use them are in position to become the most prosperous. Lack of 
position within existing social and economic structures, in effect, also leaves such citizens 
willing and able to exploit newer and riskier—but also more lucrative—social and 
economic structures. 
Women’s empowerment  
Another critical shift in the lower rungs of society that has been facilitated by the 
jangmadang economy has been the empowerment of women. As stated previously, 
although women in North Korea might not always have been officially barred from 
participating in the domestic workforce, they were certainly encouraged to marry and to 
maintain as their first priority their role (present or future) as a housewife. The attitude that 
women’s work was to care for the family, though, allowed women to disappear from their 
jobs more easily in search of food and supplies when the famine hit.148 As Smith argues, 
The entire society considered it legitimate that women should leave their 
workplaces to search for food and goods to support their families, as women 
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were understood as “naturally” responsible for domestic duties….Women’s 
participation in market activities was understood as a ‘temporary measure’ 
to deal with “temporary difficulties.”149 
As the famine worsened, more and more women began to transition from the workplace or 
home to foraging, trading, or selling whatever they could in order to provide food for their 
families and fulfill their “womanly duties.” 
As noted earlier, these market institutions would spread and transform, resulting in 
a now vibrant black-market network through many parts of the state that is dominated by 
women. Women run the market stalls and sell food and other imported commodities.150 
As result women have become the breadwinner of many families, far out earning their 
husband’s official but comparatively meager state-provided salaries. The modern North 
Korean woman makes double her husband’s monthly salary in a day, assuming that his 
state salary is still actually being paid in the first place (which is often not the case).151 
When a kilogram of rice costs 5,000 won on the black market, while the PDS hasn’t been 
fully functioning for over two decades, families—and, in particular, the husbands allowed 
and required to work in the official labor market—cannot survive without the 2,500 won 
being brought in by their wives daily.152 
Women are therefore becoming the head of the family, making decisions, and 
voicing their opinions—to the extent this reflects relative economic power. They have even 
begun to speak to their husbands in the less formal level of Korean speech, something 
usually reserved in North Korea only as husbands’ right to use toward their wives.153 
Although these facts may seem trivial to a western mindset, in North Korea, a state which 
has historically been a patriarchal society from top to bottom, they arguably represent 
gigantic steps towards empowering women, all of which can be directly linked to the 
structure of the jangmadang economy.  
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Future stability  
Overall, the breakdown of state institutions and the experience of providing for 
one’s survival has led everyday citizens to become much less dependent on the state. 
Markets which provided for citizens during the famine period, have since evolved into 
places where most commodities can be bought. The demand created for technologies such 
as TVs, DVD players, and computers have helped to breakdown the state’s control of 
foreign media and information. As mentioned before, the latter point has helped to remove 
the aura of omnipotence which once surrounded the Kim family, a factor which has 
historically played a large role in the cult of personality associated with the leading family.  
None of this necessarily implies that the DPRK is on the verge of collapse. There 
are certainly leaks and cracks beginning to form in the state’s repressive apparatus.154 
While these leaks have created some amount of distrust for the government, though, 
distrust is not equal to dissatisfaction; and there is no particular evidence to support a strong 
argument that DRPK citizens are overly unsatisfied with  the current regime.155 Perhaps 
more important, North Korean citizens lack the opportunity to turn any distrust or 
dissatisfaction into collective action, since group activity is banned—a ban that by most 
reports can still be successfully enforced—and all communications are monitored.156  
Simultaneously, low-level officials have become  dependent on the extraction of capital 
which accumulates from the corruption of the system.157 Therefore, a sort of symbiotic 
relationship which has emerged. Citizens who have grown up in  the jangmadang era might 
not trust their government, but they do understand the power of their “dollars” within the 
newly-evolved system and recognize that any change to that system might result in 
reduction of what has become their central tools for seeking profits—or simply subsistence. 
Meanwhile, the capital extracted from these market activities in the forms of bribes and 
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protection is funneled back to the center, incentivizing officials, and the state to maintain 
the status quo.  
B. THE STATES VS ELITES 
Elites’ relationship with the state has followed a different path than that of the 
average citizen. The songbun system, combined with the overwhelming and unchecked 
power of the state itself, had afforded elites access to the resources they desired in the 
command economy simply by virtue of belonging to the top-tier class. The main price 
required for these resources was undying loyalty to the state. Therefore, in the case of elites, 
loyalty to the state has historically been and continues to be the supreme currency in the 
relationship between the two. How that loyalty is shown has evolved with the growth of 
the elite economy. Elites must now show their loyalty by providing inputs to the 
revolutionary fund, and in return are supplied with luxury gifts.158 In addition to these 
gifts, they are given access to more waku, creating a clientelist relationship between elites 
and the state. Perhaps more interesting has been the struggle for influence between KWP 
elites and military elites, as Kim Jong Un has looked to increase the role of the KWP after 
more than a decade of military-first policies. The competition created between elites is an 
important part of Kim Jong Un’s North Korea and plays a vital role in shaping the political 
economy today.  
Clients of the State  
Rewarding elite members of the regime with gifts is not a new phenomenon. During 
the Kim Jong Il era, the North Korean leader would provide many comrades with expensive 
gifts such as gold-plated Rolex, cars, and houses.159 During this time period, when the 
command economy still dominated the DPRK, the funds for these gifts and the Kim family 
estate were funneled directly from Office 39 and the Daesung bank, both of which were 
under the control of the KWP.160 In the post-famine era, as the command economy has 
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failed, these institutions have grown increasingly less able to provide inputs. Thus, the 
Revolutionary Fund, which historically had played an insignificant role, began to play a 
vital one.  
As discussed above, all SOEs, whether they are run by military elites or political 
elites, are required to contribute a portion of their profits to the Revolutionary Fund. Those 
funds are then allocated towards whatever the leader deems fit. Elites are therefore doubly 
incentivized to make profits. The more profits they make, the more money they get to keep 
for themselves, but also the more political “points” they earn with Kim Jong Un. Kim is 
then incentivized to reward his top earners with more waku (and luxury consumption 
goods).161   
This has created a symbiotic relationship between elites and the state. The state 
needs elites to run their enterprises and funnel currency back to the center so that Kim Jong 
Un can then reward elites with the opportunity to generate more wealth for themselves and 
the state. As Greitens argues,  
One of the key survival techniques that North Korea has learned, therefore, 
was to harness foreign earned income to prolong its rule, and to manage its 
own elites, in part, by embedding them into the processes that generate and 
distribute foreign income.162 
Elites are now critically invested in the system created by their parallel economy. This 
vicious cycle constantly reinforces itself.  
Military Elites vs Political Elites  
It should not be assumed or taken as implied, though, that these dynamics involve 
various types of elites working harmoniously together with the North Korean state toward 
the common goal of earning money and political survival. Of course, this is hardly the case. 
To recall, during the early 2000s, as the DPRK began its recovery, songun policies vaulted 
military elites to the forefront just as decentralization of foreign trading began to take place. 
Kim Jong Il placed military officials in positions higher than their KWP counterparts, and 
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meanwhile diverted the bulk of the state’s limited resources to the military in the name of 
supporting national defense above all. Park summarizes this phenomenon cogently:  “The 
military-first policy enhanced the influence and power of the KPA under the Kim Jong-Il 
regime. With enhanced prestige, the military has somewhat intervened in various projects 
to gain economic profits.”163 Enhanced prestige allowed military elites to acquire more 
resources and rights to trading permits. This in turn allowed the military to earn more 
money to funnel back to the center, creating a cycle of increasing influence and power.  
Since 2012, Kim Jong Un has looked to reduce the power of the military, with a 
particular focus on the army. In a little under a year of rule, Kim Jong Un replaced, 
demoted, moved, or purged approximately two thirds of North Korea’s senior generals.164 
The most high-profile of these replacements was that of Ri Yung-Ho, the Chief of Staff of 
the Korean People’s Army. Hastings summarizes rumors surrounding the power struggle 
as follows:  
Kim Jong-un wanted to take back some of the trading rights that had been 
lavished on the military under Kim Jong-Il. Ri Yong-ho balked, and as a 
result was forcibly removed from office. Kim Jong-un appears to have been 
attempting to rein in the military and redistribute foreign income 
opportunities to other interest groups in the state, notably the party and the 
cabinet.165 
Ri Yong-Ho’s even daring to rebuff Kim Jong Un and the state is a testament to how high 
military elites had climbed on the domestic ladder. It is this influence and power that Kim 
Jong Un has looked to curtail since coming into power, and the KWP has been the 
beneficiary of this rebalancing.  
Kim Jong Un also looked to rein in some of the power of political elites. The very 
public purge of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, is a signal example. Following an order from 
Kim Jong Un to return ownership of a group of fisheries from Jang back to the military, a 
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fire fight broke out between Jang’s security forces and the army.166 This display of 
defiance sealed Jang’s demise; but also, tellingly, one of his officially listed crimes was 
selling off land and coal resources to pay off debts.167 Hastings argues, “If Jang was going 
to sell off state assets to foreigners, he could have at least made a profit. It was Jang’s 
business incompetence, not just his corruption and lust for power, that was worthy of 
opprobrium.”168 Although there has definitely been a more concentrated effort to rein in 
military elites, the argument could be made that Kim Jong Un has looked to rein in elite 
power as whole. Most important for this discussion, these power struggles have frequently 
revolved around competing quests to control certain economic rights.  
Future Stability  
Kim Jong Un and the state have been able to create a symbiotic relationship 
between themselves and North Korean elites. Kim Jong Un’s parallel nuclear and economic 
development policy (byungjin) is evidence that the economy is now a greater priority in 
the DPRK. As stated by a North Korean News agency, “The DPRK’s line of 
simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear force 
is the strategic line which should be permanently maintained to meet the supreme interests 
of the Korean revolution.”169 The economy being front and center alongside the 
construction of a nuclear force, which historically has been the centerpiece to North Korean 
foreign policy, represents a significant shift in North Korean politics. As evidenced from 
the previous sections , military and political elites play a pivotal role in trade and profits 
produced from SOEs. Although all of these firms are owned by the state on paper, in 
practice elites are running these enterprises and providing vital currency to the regime.  
On the other hand, the regime has been able to create an environment of competition 
across the cleavages of elites. Competition between KPA generals and KWP members is 
fueled by access to trading rights which are finite and controlled directly by Kim Jong Un. 
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One way for elites to earn political capital is to provide hard currency back to the center 
from their various SOEs. The state and Kim Jong Un need these inputs to help fund their 
own luxurious lives and buy the loyalty of North Korean elites. This process is only 
entrenching elites further and further into the survival of the state. People are certainly 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the North Korean economy today is much more complex than the 
communist label it is often given would imply. A deadly combination of internal and 
external factors combined to decimate many of the institutions vital to the original 
command economy installed by the USSR and Kim Il Sung. As a result, two parallel 
capitalist  economies have emerged since the 1990s famine years: the jangmadang (market 
ground) economy and the elite economy. The jangmadang economy initially arose as 
everyday citizens looked to find sources of food and income upon finding the PDS system 
shut down in many parts of the country. Since then, black markets have expanded in their 
role of supplying citizens with their basic needs when the state could not. As people 
recovered from the worst years of the famine, demand for commodities other than food has 
grown further, to include demand modern technologies and, among a more limited group, 
luxury items. Although many of these items cannot be produced in North Korea, smuggling 
rings have been able to inject into the jangmadang economy both luxury items and foreign 
media.  
As a result of citizens’ reliance on markets for most of their needs, their dependence 
on the state has been reduced. In conjunction with the greater depth at which foreign 
information now penetrates the DPRK, there has likely been (as best one can surmise from 
sources like defector testimony) a dimming of the god-like aura which once surrounded the 
Kim family. Women’s domination of the jangmadang economy has also led to an upheaval 
of traditional intra-family dynamics:  becoming the breadwinners of many households, has 
generated economic power that, in turn, appears to have has strengthened women’s social 
status and political power (within North Korean limits). Overall, compared to its 
predecessors, the jangmadang generation—in particular, the younger generation that has 
only known market life, but also all North Koreans compared to before—have grown more 
capitalist in nature and less dependent and in awe of the state.  
Secondly, an elite economy has developed as military and political elites looked to 
take advantage of their access to state resources and the loosening of ownership of SOEs. 
However, military elites had also begun a period of elevated status upon Kim Jong Il’s 
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accession to power in the 1990s, as Kim looked to rally the state around the cry of the 
“military first” policy. As a result, the military was the benefactor of the largest number of 
direct inputs from state resources and had the added advantage of a million-man army at 
its direct disposal to use as a labor force. Military elites were able use their prestige to 
acquire more trading rights and control more firms. Political elites, on the other hand, have 
been able to recoup some of their influence in the state because Kim Jong Un, more 
recently, has reined in the power of the military and redistributed their trading rights to 
members of the KWP and regime. Both sets of elites were able to use their respective 
trading firms to secure waku and expand their collective and individual economic holdings 
and in the post-famine era. The state, meanwhile, in exchange for access to trading rights, 
requires a “kickback” share in the form of contribution to such state coffers as the 
Revolutionary Fund. In total, while an antagonistic relationship has been created between 
different sets of elites, as each looks to compete for state resources, a symbiotic relationship 
has been created between the state and elites because each side needs the other for 
opportunities for revenue accumulation.  
What do all of these changes mean for the DPRK? For many, the question of North 
Korean stability is not if but when will it collapse. But with the state’s seventy years of 
existence in mind, it is time to recognize the North Korean regime as much more resilient 
than many experts would claim. Changes to the North Korean economy, in particular, have 
created many different groups interested in maintaining the status quo, and seem not to 
have empowered the left-out who might not be. Groups interested in maintaining the status 
quo include everyday citizens making a livable wage (by North Korean standards) in black 
markets, low-level officials who in a day make more from bribes than their monthly salary, 
elites who run large SOEs and have gained a considerable amount of wealth for 
themselves—and even Kim Jong Un himself, who has been able to maintain a life of luxury 
and buy loyalty from critical elites. These groups represent a large and disproportionately 
powerful swath of the population, with strong incentives to ensure regime stability and a 
continuation of the current system. There has certainly been a weakening of state power, 
but nothing substantial enough to lead to a strong expectation of impending doom for the 
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North Korean state. The communist state of North Korea will likely continue alongside its 
hidden capitalist society for the foreseeable future. 
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